I will be writing on concepts or, more correctly, concept and objects. In Christopher Peacocke’s terms, it will be “a theory of thought” as applied to concepts and objects.
In the paper I will be speaking of concepts in the psychological sense of the word. That is, concepts as the contents of thoughts. (This, in itself, is not a denial of other notions or forms of concepts.) My task is to determine how people think about the world. More precisely, it is an attempt to show the relation between mental concepts and the world of objects and the ramifications this has on various issues.
I will focus on the aspects of mental concepts that will be covered in the paper. For example, the “dualism” of concepts and objects which is thrown up by such issues as conceptual criteria of identity of concepts and objects, the intensionality of concepts, and the putative primacy of ontology of objects over concepts of objects and so on.
What, exactly, is a mental concept? A mental concepts is something, whether propositional or language-like or a “phase space” etc. However, this is a question that belongs to the metaphysics of mind, or even the ontology of mental objects. It doesn’t belong to a theory of thought.
Concepts Before Objects
Do concepts come from classifying together objects of a certain kind or are the concepts themselves used as tools to do so? Do the concepts or the things of a certain kind come first? This parallels an old primary question in the philosophy of science. Does theory (or hypothesis) or observation come first? The metaphysical realist would say that concepts (or theories) are determined by - or a result of - noticing similarities and distinguishing kinds. But without prior concepts how would we recognise such similarities? How would we know that two things were similar unless they already came under concepts that made them similar? Perhaps here we can distinguish primary from secondary concepts. Primary concepts set us on our way in our investigation. Secondary concepts, on the other hand, are cognitively applied. So primary concepts tell us what is similar to what. They don’t grow out of the similarity. There must be some conceptual facts about the objects that make us class them together. These are primary concepts. So certain concepts must already be in place when observing things. Of course, this doesn’t stop us applying or deploying new – secondary - concepts to objects (or observations).
To repeat. We don’t randomly pick two objects or things and see if they are similar and then apply concepts. If concepts, or a theory (i.e., a set of linked concepts), don’t guide us, we may as well compare a frog with a car or a star with a photon (even they share the concept [object] or the concept [thing]). Just as on the Davidsonian scheme, we don’t see “sensory data” and then construct them into obkects and events, but see objects and events from the beginning, so too do we not see unconceptualised entities and then apply concepts. Every thing comes with concepts, unless we are having what is called a “non-conceptual experience” (such a thing can also be doubted for cognisers).
Just as observations are “theory-laden” from the start, so objects and things are concept-laden from the start. Also, to perceive a thing as a distinct or particular thing, that thing needs to be, we could say, a fact or a group of facts (see Dretske’s distinction). That is, factual realities of a thing determine its deliniation and circumscription. So we could say, again, that a thing is a fact (or a group thereof).
Travel the world and we wont find a place that we don’t automatically or non-cognitively conceptualise. Even in outer space this would be the case. And, possibly, also in other possible worlds, depending on how alien they are conceived to be. (How alien, or conceptually alien, can another possible world be?)
The concept [cat] is not simply derived from an analysis of the physical structure of particular cats. Prior concepts must come first. If it were simply a case of physical analysis, then if one particular cat had three legs and a big wart on its nose, then such things would become atomic conceptual criteria of the now molecular concept [cat]. And resemblance doesn’t escape prior concepts. Take an analyser of cats who comes across two ginger cats. The ginger of one cat resembles the ginger of the other. Therefore being ginger becomes a conceptual criterion of identity for cats for this cogniser. If we were doing philosophy of science and not the “theory of thought”-cum-ontology, we would say that prior theories of cats would make us dispense with observations of gingerness as being a – necessary – criterion of identity for being a cat (if we need to bring in the modal term “necessary” at all).
Of course concepts can’t be determining everything about experience, observation and ontological scrutiny of objects, otherwise there would never be conceptual change. The point is, though, that prior concepts will help determine change too. Unconceptualised phenomena don’t determine conceptual change. However, there’s nothing to stop us thinking that there’s something wrong with a particular concept or a group of concepts (a theory) or a whole set of conceptual criteria of identity for an object. But some kind of conceptual identity needs to be already in place.
Concept and Object Dualism
The theory of the concept is part of the theory of thought and epistemology, a theory of the object or objects is part of metaphysics and ontology. (Peacocke, 1989)
Introduction
Peacocke, above, wrote that the “theory of the concept is part of the theory of thought and epistemology”, whereas “a theory of the object or objects is part of metaphysics and ontology”. This particular taxonomy could quite possibly be a little too neat and tidy. What if it entails some kind of “dualism of scheme and content” (see Davidson )? More specifically, what if it entails a dualism of concepts and objects? The idea seems to be that first we firstly have ontology, and in our ontology we talk about so-far “uninterpreted” objects, and then, later, we apply concepts to these unconceptualised objects.
But what if one can’t have cognised objects without concepts? Objects of some type or description exist without concepts, sure, they are therefore mind-independent, but they can’t be cognised, that is, known, seen, spoken of etc. without concepts.
This is why later I shall talk about the conceptual criteria of identity for concepts rather than objects. The reasoning behind this is as follows. If concrete objects require conceptual criteria of identity in order to be cognised as the objects that they are, then so too do the mental concepts that belong to or are applied to objects. In fact, this way of putting it implies that there can be a temporal or epistemic distinction: the concrete object, unconceptualised, comes first, and then the concepts are applied. Perhaps, however, there are no unconceptualised concrete objects that are then cognised: known, seen or spoken of. And to talk about the unknown, unseen and unspoken of concrete objects is to talk about – next to - nothing.
So the conceptual criteria of identity which are applied to object x can be the very same conceptual criteria which are applied to concept [C] ofx. When you use one, you could use the other and vice versa. This is not a commitment to the impossibility of mind-independence or the numerical or any strict identity between mental concepts and concrete objects (or objects and their concepts). Take this reason why not.
Mental concepts are intensional: two different single-criterion concepts could be applied to the same object. And consequently this means that one person’s conceptual criteria of identity for object x may not necessarily correspond with another person’s conceptual criteria for concept [C] (of x).
Modes of Presentation and Their Objects
Christopher Peacocke’s phrase “modes of presentation of a property” clearly implies that the property exists separately from “modes of presentation”. However, we self-evidently cognise nothing of that presentation-free property. We can only cognise it through “modes of presentation”. The property cannot be known, seen, spoken of etc. from nowhere.
There is no ontology without “modes of presentation”. Therefore there is no ontology without Peacocke’s “theory of thought”. In a certain sense there is no ontology at all if it is taken, as it were, as FirstPhilosophy to Peacocke’s “theory of thought”(Second Philosophy?).
However, the intensional nature of concepts is seen with Peacocke’s (or Frege’s) “modes of presentation of a property”. Here again we have a dualism of “presentation” and property presented. This time, instead of the same object x we have the same property. So different “modes of presentation” or concepts can be applied to the same property without any ontological commitment, on my part, to the putative unconceptualised primacy of the property. The property, as I said about object x earlier, could be the victim of hundreds of “modes of presentation”. Indeed, it may be the case that certain “modes of presentation” could be deemed epistemically or scientifically correct and others incorrect. The property, however, still wears conceptual clothes if it is cognised.
Peacocke’s “dualism of scheme and content” (see Davidson) can also be seen between the psychological concepts or his “modes of presentation”, on the one hand, and the ontological concept – and primacy? – of a property to which “modes of presentation” refer on the other. (This is a reworking of Frege’s “sense” and “reference” distinction.)
Peacocke himself explains this dualism when he says he wants “to distinguish properties from modes of presentation of properties “ (1983). And he does so by arguing that “only the properties themselves…enter causal explanations”. I would agree that the property is causal in a way that “modes of presentation” (MOP) are not. But this causal independence from MOP of properties doesn’t mean that the property can be given up to us free from MOP. Just as Ned Block can indeed distinguish what he calls “access-consciousness” from “phenomenal-consciousness” (1995), and yet we can say that they always occur together, so Peacocke is correct to distinguish the property from MOP of it. However, the property is only cognised under MOP and therefore under concepts. This is like Spinoza’s ontological monism vis-a-vis conceptual dualism (mind as a “mode” or attribute of matter). Similarly, Davidson, learning from Spinoza, does the same with slightly different terms. We could say that Davidson’s matter squares with Peacocke’s “property” and Davidson’s mentality with Peacocke’s MOP. The MOP do indeed depend on the property, whereas the property doesn’t depend on MOP. Similarly, the mind depends on the brain. However, the property does depend on MOP when it comes to our cognitions of it. So in that aspect there’s no real distinction. The property, therefore, is like Davidson’s mentality, which can’t exist without the brain. The parallel, though, is inverted. Peacocke’s property depends on minds when cognised, whereas Davidson’s mentality depends on matter. This point is clinched by saying that Peacocke’s mind-independent (MI) property, which exists, is like Wittgenstein’s “wheel which is not part of the mechanism”. It serves no purpose other than to be the subject of statements about mind-independence itself by metaphysical realists. Apart from that, it is vacuous.
So my point is not an idealist one. MI properties do indeed exist, but they may as well not do. This will sound like philosophical philistinianism only to those who don’t accept or know the arguments that lead up to this position.
We cannot escape from causal forces. They exert their influence no matter what. But the facts or statements we utter about such causal forces are dependent on our concepts. Sheer brute force causes us to make particular assertions. Concepts help determine the interpretation of causal forces. We can, therefore, respond in different ways to the same causal forces depending on pre-existing concepts.
We can accept the causation, that is, retinal stimulation. As Davidson puts it:
…causation is not under a description, but explanation is.
We can also accept the causal independence of phenomena. The problem may be that we can describe the same causal processes in different ways, depending on our prior concepts and the concepts that already belong, as it were, to those causal forces.
Wilfred Sellars said that “it takes a long time…for the causal links to whip us properly correspondent shape…”
Is this why Peacocke talks about “properties” and not “objects”? Like his introduction of “causal explanations” there is no elaboration. However, I will say that “properties” are, in a sense, philosophical constructs like “sense-data”. This is not to say that properties don’t exist according to some ontological taxonomical scheme (they are part of the “furniture of the world”), but if we are doing Peacocke’s “theory of thought”, we don’t cognise properties, we cognise objects, events - particular individuated objects, events , etc.
Although I feel uncomfortable about adhering too closely to a particular philosopher, Davidson says that “interpretation”…depends on “external events and objects” not “patterns of sensory stimulation” (Davidson’s reference to what he perceives to be Quine’s position).
Peacocke’s reference to “causal explanations” also parallels, to some extent, a position of Crispin Wright. Take this passage:
The hope must be either that we can yet win through to some purified notion of an observation statement [or property], one that does not include ‘theory-ladenness’… (1992, 167-8)
The above quote shows us that Wright is attempting to make a scheme/content distinction or separation like Peacocke’s property/MOP distinction. Wright is explicit about this. Whereas Peacocke appears to stress the ontological primacy of the property over MOP (which belong to a “theory of thought”), Wright stresses ‘input’:
…differences of opinion…can be satisfactorily explained in terms of divergent ‘input’…different information… (31)
That is
If A goes in, S must come out.
But if we can’t escape from MOP or concepts generally, A (the property or the ‘input’) may well go in, but it is not necessary that S comes out.
Can the property exist without MOP? Yes. Can the reference exist without “senses”? Yes. What can we cognise of the presentation-free property? Nothing. What can we cognise of the sense-less reference? Nothing. So what’s the point of them?
However, I accept the following dualism because it is non-epistemic - it is neuroscientific. Firstly we have
a)Visual sensations…form the output of this early modular processing, and stand ready to produce conceptual responses…[they] feed into the conceptual system. (1990)
And then
b) Concepts get to work on them. But cognitively or epistemically we are not aware of .
In order to cognise an object as a particular object concepts must be deployed and must have already have been applied. Cognising an object as a particular object entails individuation, differentiation and possibly identification of the object which itself entails the application of conceptual criteria of identity. Of course the object under scrutiny may well already have been individuated. This wouldn’t stop new conceptual criteria being applied to it. For example, the initial individuation of the object may have been crude and of little use.
Putting ontology first before our conceptualisations of the object (“theory of thought”) implies to me that the object under scrutiny will somehow impose concepts of itself on us. All we need to do is sit back and wait for the process to begin. This also implies a kind of algorithmic process between the object and the mind that will be invariant for a particular subject and even invariant between subjects and the same object. That algorithmic process will be:
(the same) object (input) š (the same) concept/s (output)
Non-Conceptual Proper Names and TheirObjects
One of my concepts of Tony Blair, for example, could be [the lying politician]. Another person’s concept could be [the great Prime Minister]. This is a mischievous way at hinting at the possibility of an object, Tony Blair, being distinguishable from all mental concepts of Tony Blair. It is still the case that Tony Blair will be covered by concepts even if the two suggested above are never utilised. We cannot cognise the object as Tony Blair without mental concepts, which make the object capable of being known as Tony Blair, or seen as Tony Blair, or spoken of as “Tony Blair”.
So different mental concepts of x don’t imply the ontological primacy of x before mental concepts are applied to it. In theory, object x could have endless concepts applied to it. But every cognised object would be conceptualised in some shape or form. A cognised x would always be conceptualised.
Back to Tony Blair.
Kripke argued that the proper name “Tony Blair” is not a description (“disguised” or otherwise). It is a “rigid designator”. The rigid designator “Tony Blair” designates Tony Blair no matter what conceptual flux surrounds Tony Blair. Concepts don’t change Tony Blair. And names don’t change Tony Blair. But to know Tony Blair as something other than the x we need concepts. And “Tony Blair” strictly speaking is a non-conceptual and non-descriptive rigid designator. Since “Tony Blair” has designated Tony Blair, it designates him rigidly. Tony Blair will always be “Tony Blair” therefore we can refer to Tony Blair instead of x. But the name “Tony Blair” doesn’t individuate, differentiate and identify Tony Blair, it just designates him. This is a metaphysical point. The actual conceptual individuation is psychological. x isn’t necessarily [Tony Blair] because it is an applied mental concept. If “Tony Blair” is non-conceptual, then x or Tony Blair is necessarily “Tony Blair”.
I don’t think this in itself means that we don’t need mental concepts of Tony Blair to know Tony Blair as Tony Blair, to see Tony Blair as Tony Blair, to speak of Tony Blair as “Tony Blair”. It only means that the thing we have baptised or named “Tony Blair”, which is a contingent act, is Tony Blair no matter what concepts or names we throw at it. The object we have named “Tony Blair” always designates the object Tony Blair no matter what the conceptual flux around him is like. The rigid designator “Tony Blair” is applied to the object Tony Blair, but the object which is rigidly designated by the name “Tony Blair” is still known as the object, not name, Tony Blair, seen as Tony Blair via mental concepts. The object, Tony Blair, itself doesn’t depend on the mental concepts of other people for its existence (though Tony Blair may depend psychologically on other people’s concepts of him). However, Tony Blair as Tony Blair does depend on mental concepts. If we didn’t have one or more concepts of the object Tony Blair, we wouldn’t be able to know that the name “Tony Blair” referred to the object Tony Blair. We would only know that “Tony Blair” was applicable to something that is called “Tony Blair”.
Kripke was making a metaphysical point. I’m making a point about conceptual thought and the identification of objects as particular objects.
To repeat.
The name “Tony Blair” requires accompanying metal concepts in order to individuate, differentiate and therefore identify Tony Blair as Tony Blair. The relation between the name “Tony Blair” and the object Tony Blair could be said to belong to philosophy of mind or, as Peacocke puts it, the “theory of thought”. Mental concepts of the individuation, differentiation and identification of Tony Blair, which amounts to applying conceptual criteria of identity to Tony Blair, could be concepts of his looks and or his position, behaviour etc. There could even be a singular (if unlikely) concept of Tony Blair: [Tony Blair is the object which fits the name “Tony Blair”]. (Of course this molecular concept is made up of atomic concepts.) We could still ask: How can this singular mental concept successfully individuate, differentiate and identify Tony Blair as Tony Blair? It is unlikely that such a concept on its own, even if made up of atomic concepts, could do the job of individuating etc any single object.
My point about the reliance of conceptual criteria even for proper names can be found in another form 46 years ago in the words of John Searle (1958). Of course the proper name “Tony Blair” has no “sense” and it isn’t in itself a description. However, “Tony Blair”, the name, is “logically tied” to particular concepts of Tony Blair. Tony Blair can’t be individuated as Tony Blair without concepts (or “characteristics” or a “sense” in Searle’s terms). I would qualify not the technical terms of Searle but his statement that the name “Tony Blair” must be “logically tied to particular [my italics] characteristics” of Tony Blair. Particular concepts, or “characteristics” are not needed. Any will do, as long as “Tony Blair” is conceptualised in some shape or form.
I would also disagree with Searle when he says once we have identified the referent of “Tony Blair” we can “forget or ignore these various descriptions” (91) which helped designate Tony Blair. We will still need to conceptualise both the name “Tony Blair” and the object Tony Blair. We need not even rely on any of the past concepts (or “descriptions”) of Tony Blair, as long as he relies on a concept or concepts of some shape or form which will individuate Tony Blair as Tony Blair. So this may be why Searle said that these concepts “are not part of the sense” (91) of the proper name “Tony Blair”. He doesn’t think that “Tony Blair” has a sense. But does it follow that because of this conceptual flux surrounding the name “Tony Blair”, and, therefore, the object Tony Blair, there is no “sense” attached to the name “Tony Blair”? The conceptual flux (or descriptional flux) seems to hint at, for Searle, the name’s independence from concepts. But not having determinate and long-lasting concepts attached to “Tony Blair” doesn’t mean that no concepts therefore are attached to “Tony Blair”. (All this depends on whether or not we can distinguish the terms “concept” and “sense”.)
I agree, concepts of Tony Blair do not determine or fix reference for everyone because other people may use other concepts to apply to Tony Blair. So the object itself does the determining or the fixing. This is one reason why we can distinguish x from the concepts of x. If the “a” and “b” (definite descriptions) of Kripke’s conceptual scheme become in my mind the concepts [the lying politician] and [the great PM], then “in every possible world” (1971) [lying politician] and [the great PM] wont “refer to this same object x” (Tony Blair). But does this make the proper name “Tony Blair” non-conceptual? Tony Blair, or x, can be distinguished from a particular concept, or thousands of concepts (or all concepts if he is no longer cognised). It is absolutely clear (obvious) that [the great PM] need not refer to Tony Blair, or [the lying politician] for that matter. So “Tony Blair”, the proper name, is certainly not like [the lying politician]. For a start, everyone shares the name “Tony Blair”, but few share the concept [the lying politician] of Tony Blair. And even the person who exclusively uses the concept [the lying politician] cannot dispense with the name “Tony Blair”. The name lets other people know who he is talking about when he uses the definite description “the lying politician” (the sentential expression of the concept [the lying politician]). (Some people, of course, will know who or what he means by “the lying politician”.)
But just because everyone shares the name “Tony Blair”, it doesn’t in itself make it non-conceptual. We all share the word “liberty” but we wouldn’t call that word “non-conceptual”. Of course, “Tony Blair” is a proper name and “liberty” is an (abstract) noun. And, yes, a concrete object (Blair) is more likely to “fix a name” than an abstract object (for obvious reasons).
“Tony Blair” must, therefore, be nonconceptual because its referent is a particular concrete object. “Liberty” hasn’t got such a referent and neither has a noun of a class of concrete objects like “cat”. So “Tony Blair” does indeed refer to a particular concrete object, unlike [the lying politician] or “the lying politician” or “liberty” or “cat”. So there are good reasons to believe that “Tony Blair” is different from a concept, a definite description, an abstract noun and a concrete noun. It seems that there is a precise and determinate correlation between “Tony Blair” and Tony Blair. But does this distinctiveness and this determinateness entail non-conceptuality? Does it determine that “Tony Blair” is indeed a rigid designator? No matter what’s being said, “Tony Blair” is tied to Tony Blair with the help of concepts. The name “Tony Blair” is conceptual therefore the object Tony Blair is conceptual. It is indeed the case that a proper noun has a special status. The proper name is shared by all who don’t share concepts or descriptions of Tony Blair. But that, again, doesn’t make it non-conceptual. We could say that Tony Blair is first level. The name “Tony Blair” is seond-level. And the concepts of Tony Blair or “Tony Blair” like [the lying politician] are third level. However, all three levels are conceptual. The object Tony Blair is cognised via concepts. The name “Tony Blair” is a second-level term, more important and more shared than the third-level concepts. And, of course, the third-level concepts are obviously conceptual.
It could even be the case that the third-level concepts are reliant on the conceptual second-level “Tony Blair” or first-level Tony Blair (they amount to the same thing). As I said, the shared name “Tony Blair” makes communication possible. It is invariant because it always applies to Tony Blair. As Kripke said about “b” or my concept [the lying politician] may not apply to Tony Blair in another possible world. The proper name “Tony Blair” has therefore special status, as agreed. It is special because it does indeed refer to Tony Blair without specific concepts or descriptions. But this doesn’t stop people giving “Tony Blair” specific concepts. The referent determines the name “Tony Blair” (on, say, a causal theory of reference). But, the other way around, “Tony Blair” can only refer to Tony Blair via concepts. There is a two-way process. One, from Tony Blair to concepts of Tony Blair. Two, from the concepts of Tony Blair to Tony Blair. The object, Tony Blair, is non-conceptual when uncognised. But if it is cognised, it will cause or determine our concepts of Tony Blair. So there is a relation between the uncognised x and the proper name of x. But as soon as x reached out to the proper name, as it were, it is immediately cognised and therefore conceptualised. Because it is the second of the two-way process: from concepts to x. And you can’t have x to concepts without having concepts to x (or vice versa). The first-level world (of objects), the second-level world (of proper names) and the third-level world (of concepts) are all distinct yet necessarily interrelated. The case of the first-level world (of objects) which does no depend on the second- or third-level world unless cognised. Clearly the second-level world depends on the first- and third-level world. And finally the third-level world (of concepts) depends on the second- and first-level worlds. The second-level world (of proper names) is a kind of axis which the indeterminate first-level world and the conceptual flux of the third-level world gravitate. The second-level “Tony Blair” is clearly more important and distinctive than my own [the lying politician]. Also the object Tony Blair is more important and relevant than my contingent concept [the lying politician] too. But this clear hierarchy
Objects
↨
Proper names
↨
(arbitrary) concepts
doesn’t stop concepts being important and relevant to all three worlds. Just because we can distinguish the three levels above, it doesn’t make any level non-conceptual. (Compare this with Ned Block’s CS “phenomenal consciousness”, which can be distinguished from “access consciousness”. However, it may be the case that they always – or have to – exist together. Fingers and hands.)
I don’t need to know Tony Blair as “Tony Blair”. I could still know him as something – an individuated object. The object others have called “Tony Blair” would already be conceptualised and we could apply new concept to that object. To state the obvious. If we don’t attach to the object Tony Blair the name “Tony Blair” then that name may not itself have any concepts attached to it. It will be a bare name. Indeed, it wouldn’t really be a name at all if it didn’t have an individuated referent. It would simply be inscripted letters on a page or vocables from a mouth.
We have no grasp of objects like Tony Blair without concepts. Nothing can be said of them and they can’t be cognised. And clearly we have no concept of what an object in general is without mental concepts. Individuation etc is required for the very notion of an object in general.
From the possibility or actuality of objects existing mind-independently, has come the metaphysical realist’s position, which upholds the primacy of the ontology of objects over our conceptualisations of objects (which itself belongs to the “theory of thought”, according to Peacocke). But if nothing can be known, seen, spoken of etc of mind-independent objects, then it is hard to make sense of what this primacy of ontology really amounts to.
The ontology of objects cannot study objects as they are “in themselves” for basically Kantian reasons. And for basically Berkelian reasons all we have to go on are mental concepts of objects (without, necessarily, accepting Berkeley’s denial of the material object). We can’t get out of our skins. Objects don’t tell us what to say about them. Or, alternatively, they may tell different people differentthings. We may impose mental concepts as much on objects as objects impose concepts on us. And indeed there may be many versions of a particular object which we find acceptable.
Even if objects are MI (mind-independent), they are still cognised by minds otherwise they would be of no use to us. And even if concepts are determined or caused by MI phenomena (which I think they are), of whatever stripe, they are still determining or causing mental content. There is indeed some kind of gap between mind and MI. However, we have no cognisance, by definition, of MI phenomena. So they – should - effectively “drop out of the picture”.
So, yes, all mental concepts are determined or caused by, or have a relationship to. things that aren’t mental. Things that don’t depend on minds for their existence. However, they can’t be cognised by minds without giving up their MI status.
My concepts may well be mental objects, but they are still ultimately, directly or indirectly, dependent on or caused by external concrete objects in a manner more or less specified 300 yeas ago by the British Empiricists.
There is no concept without an object. There is no cognised object without a concept. (Therefore the concept [concept] is an empty class.)
However, just as I stress the importance of mental concepts and not objects, there is nothing to stop me similarly stressing objects instead by saying that one cannot have mental concepts without concrete objects. This is effectively a commitment to the intentionality of concepts. Concepts are of – or require – objects in order to be the concepts which they are. A concept’s object could be – or must be (by my own arguments) – another concept or a thought etc. In that case, the concept’s object would either be a mental object (another concept) or a mental state or act (a thought or thoughts). And, of course, thoughts are themselves made-up of concepts.
The concepts we impose on objects will themselves have been determined by concrete objects in a kind of “strange loop”.
So what do ontologists mean by “object” or “objects”? Something separate from “all schemes and science”? How, exactly, is this miraculous separation made? It may be a noble endeavour, but is it possible? Could we come to an object with the cleansed mind of an aprioristic philosopher? If yes, the tabula rasa mind would simply be imprinted with the object’s own concepts. Not only that, but the object as a particular object would individuate itself from the surrounding flux or manifold.
Mental Concepts of Mental Objects
My very term, "mental object”, could be platonist. That is, what does a mental object share with a concrete or physical object? The answer is that I just take the term to apply to anything that is or can be individuated as a particular thing separable from other particular things (however gerrymandered the object may in fact be).
Mental concepts are not just mental concepts of objects; they are objects themselves – mental objects. The term “object” seems also to be acceptable if one is a non-reductive physicalist. One could even say that a particular mental concept is made-up of two objects or Spinozean “modes” of the same physical substance: the mental object that is the cognised concept and the neurophysical substrate on which it supervenes .
Of course the identification of the neurophysical substrate of a particular mental concept would be, apparently, well-nigh impossible due to the holistic findings and conclusions of contemporary neuroscience and philosophy of mind. But the particular mental concept would still have a neurophysical supervenience base of some description (perhaps God’s), even if the mental concept were not truly autonomous from other mental concepts and other mental acts, events, states etc. (Of course, a Cartesian substance dualist need not buy any of this!)
The mental concept is dependent or supervenient upon a neurophysical substrate (and perhaps worldly facts if one is an externalist). It is not identical with it. The concept could even be reduced to a neurophysical substrate and talked of in terms of neurophysical predicates without concluding that conceptual predicates are in any way eliminable. Such a reduction may well be empirically or even logically impossible. This would not be a denial or rejection of the fact that there would be some kind of neurophysical reduction base, even if externalist facts come into the question. My point is that there is a physical substrate, either within or without the skull.
I think, or hope, that the above analysis makes mental concepts naturalistically kosher. However, I must stress, again, that it is a prima facie commitment to non-reductive physicalism.
Mental concepts have conceptual criteria of identity; they are not applied. The application of conceptual criteria would imply that a mental concept could exist without having concepts. The idea of applying concepts to mental concepts doesn’t make sense because a mental concept has no existence without concepts. Non-mental objects, concrete objects, on the other hand, always have conceptual criteria of identity by previous applications, but can also have new conceptual criteria of identity (or concepts) applied to them. A similar point (or the same point expressed differently) is that objects already have concepts applied to them, but also have new concepts applied. To state the obvious. Concrete objects can exist without minds. Mental objects or concepts self-evidently can’t.
As I’ve said, a mental molecular concept is a mental object that is built-up of certain mental atomic concepts. In a sense, this is indeed a kind of idealism about mental concepts (what else could it be?), but it is not an idealist position vis-à-vis mind-external concrete objects.
Despite the above, talk of mental concepts as “mental objects” is not a commitment to metaphysical idealism. One reason for this is that intentionality is essential for mental concepts. That is, concepts require external concrete objects (and internal mental objects) onto which they point or direct themselves. And even internal mental objects (thoughts, other concepts etc) onto which mental concepts point are themselves ultimately dependent upon external concrete objects in a loose British Empiricist kind of way. That is, we can have mental concepts of golden mountains but not of round squares.
So whereas we reject the dualism of mental concepts and “uninterpreted” or unconceptualised external concrete objects, we need not reject the dualism of mental concepts and mental objects because self-evidently the latter are mental too. Not only that, these mental objects are also made-up of mental concepts. So there is no exact symmetry between the two.
Change the mental concept and you change the mental object. And if the mental object is changed, so too is the mental concept. So applying new concepts to a particular concept would mean changing the mental concept and, therefore, changing the mental object. It would not, therefore, strictly be a application of new concepts to a concept because the concept would not be the concept it was before the application. If, on the other hand, one applies new mental concepts to an already conceptualised concrete object we do not change the concreteness of the object, only our presentations of it.
In a sense, mental concepts or atomic mental concepts are the quasi-physical nature of a molecular mental concepts. A concrete object, on the other hand, is not literally made-up of concepts, it is made up of atoms, molecules, space-time points etc.
The Concept of Concept: Mental Object and Mental Concept
We can ask whether a particular mental concept has conceptual criteria of identity and we can ask whether the concept of a concept in general has conceptual criteria of identity. The concept [concept] would require concepts to be applied to it. Just as we can have concepts of a particular object and the concept of an object in general, so too do we have particular concepts and the concept of a concept in general (or of the concept [concept]). But can we have a concept of the concept [concept]? Perhaps without objects, abstract, concrete or mental, concepts are empty or even meaningless. Therefore we can’t have a concept of a concept in general in the way we can have a concept of an object in general or of a particular object. A concept of a concept in general or of the concept [concept] would be like a class without members or a nation without a populace.
A particular mental concept is about or applied to a particular or a group of particulars . Perhaps we have reached an ontological brick wall here that we cannot pass. That is, we cannot allow into our ontology the concept [concept]. Objects, of various descriptions, legitimise concepts, but no object legitimises the concept [concept].
Perhaps we could say that there are no mental particulars, that is, concepts, to legitimise the universal Concept (just as we have no particulars for, say, Truth – see later). And without particulars, there is no universal. Therefore there may not be the concept [concept].
We can have a concept of an object in general because there are concrete objects that determine such a conceptWe can have a concept of a cat in general for similar reasons. Can we have a concept of a concept in general? Prior theories and concepts of cats and cats themselves tell us what concepts to use of a cat in general. Can concepts in the plural do the same for the concept of a concept in general? Cats are concrete. Concepts of cats are mental. Concepts of cats and other objects are mental and the concept [concept] must be mental too.
Even if we change mental concepts into mental objects, the concept [concept] would still be of or about other mental phenomena: i.e. mental concepts. But can we have a concept of something which is already a concept without changing the object-concept in a way in which you can’t literally change a concrete object?
So we can’t have a concept of a concept in general because a concept in general or a particular concept are already self-evidently concepts. This would be like having an object of an object rather than a concept of an object. Concepts are directional or intentional. Therefore the concept [concept] would be directed at something that is already directional or intentional. To have a concept of a particular concept is to change the concept and therefore the concept-object would not be the original intentional object. Similarly, the concept of a concept in general is about - or of - all concepts, and it too would change the particulars and therefore they would no longer be what they originally were.
There would be no point of having a concept if the concept literally changed the object or mental object-concept of the concept. We can, on the other hand, have different concepts of concrete objects which do not change the concrete reality of the objects.
